

The Golden Opportunity: Reorganizing Headquarters, Marine Corps for the Future

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The Golden Opportunity:

Reorganizing Headquarters, Marine Corps for the Future

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED WARFIGHTING

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Table of Contents

Introduction	2
Effects of Goldwater-Nichols on the Commandant's Role	4
Current Responsibilities of the Commandant and his Staff	9
HQMC Organization Initiatives	14
Into the Next Millenium	25
Endnotes	37
Bibliography	40
Tables	A-G

Introduction

Under the premise of defense reorganization, many changes have been implemented throughout the Department of Defense and the United States Marine Corps. The Goldwater-Nichols Act redefined the Commandant's role as service chief, and defense reform initiatives are changing the relationships and organizations within the Marine Corps. This period of change provides the Marine Corps with a golden opportunity to reorganize the management of its headquarters functions in Washington, D.C. and Quantico. Currently, the Corps is proceeding with a sweeping, in-depth assessment of its "business process" management through the Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Program. The reforms which this program promises to deliver are substantial and will have a significant, positive impact on the Marine Corps "business enterprise"; but the reform initiatives may miss the mark if they fail to achieve measurable results, and if the changes cannot be institutionalized throughout the Marine Corps. Furthermore, if reforms at the Marine Corps headquarters level fail to address Marines' needs for focused, relevant information, and improvements in quality of life, then the Marine Corps will be hard-pressed to compete for the type of individuals it requires for future success on the battlefield.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act, along with various Department of Defense directives, provide the framework from which the Commandant derives his principal responsibilities. The *National Military Strategy* and *Quadrennial Defense Review* provide the roadmap upon which the Commandant must navigate to meet those responsibilities.

From some perspectives, the guidance given to the Marine Corps for its future roles and missions is clear, yet there is a great deal of uncertainty ahead. To provide the Marine Corps with the guidance it needs in order to plan and provide for the future, the Commandant has developed his own vision, which stems from the document, *Forward...From the Sea*. His vision is further focused in *The Commandant's Planning Guidance* and *The Marine Corps Master Plan for the 21st Century*. So there is no shortage of strategic guidance for the Marine Corps, as an organization. The real question, then, is whether or not the Marine Corps is properly organized (at the highest level) to achieve its strategic goals.

This paper explores the issues surrounding the role of the Commandant and his headquarters, serving as a starting point for discussions of the role and organization of HQMC for the years 2010 and beyond. After examining how the Commandant's role has been affected by Goldwater- Nichols and other reform initiatives, this paper will examine the Marine Corps' own reform effort, the Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Program (MCCPIP). Finally, some observations will be drawn to highlight particular concerns of the author once MCCPIP reform implementation begins.

Effects of Goldwater-Nichols on the Commandant's Role

The Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, or Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), was made into law just over ten years ago. The law has contributed greatly towards improving the performance of U. S. Armed Forces including the quality of military advice given to the President; leading the various Military Departments towards truly joint operations; and paring down unnecessary and redundant capabilities. The law's objectives were to further reorganize the Department of Defense (a process which has been underway since WW II), and strengthen civilian authority. These were accomplished primarily by restructuring the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) -- increasing the cross-service responsibility and autonomy of the Chairman (CJCS) -- and by granting greater responsibility and authority to the specified and unified combatant commanders in chief (CinCs) to accomplish their missions. The CinCs are now directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS and increased attention is being paid to strategic and contingency planning, as well as to more efficient use of defense resources.¹ But many of these changes raised questions as to the role the individual service chiefs were to play in the restructured Defense Department.

Direct effects of the Act have had mixed results. GNA did gain some uniformity between the services by delineating specific responsibilities of service secretaries and chiefs. The Act also attempted to separate civilian and military functions between service staff and the service secretary. This has been only partially successful and there is still too much redundancy in the beurocratic layers at this level.² The GNA has caused all of the

services to re-evaluate staff structures and responsibilities to meet the changing landscape created by the legislation. How the Marine Corps has done this will be addressed shortly.

Although directly specifying responsibilities of the military departments and service chiefs, the greatest impact of the GNA for the Commandant comes from the law's indirect effects. The CJCS was elevated to the position of sole, principal military advisor to the President, replacing the JCS corporate body as the advisor. This may appear to have limited the Commandant's advice-giving role, but in reality, it has not. The service chiefs have many means by which they can exert influence. The GNA sought to balance the service chiefs' normally parochial service advocacy with a perspective that avoided the pitfalls of parochialism. Mechanisms such as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC), and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) Process have all been modified or invented to bring this perspective to the JCS, and the service chiefs greatly influence each process.

The JROC seeks to build a better joint perspective and senior military consensus across a wide range of issues in order to define joint requirements which are not duplicative, but are complementary.³ The JROC Chairman, the responsibilities of which are delegated to the Vice-Chairman of the JCS, established the JWCA process to make innovative responses to the requirements of the CinCs. To help with this effort, each Joint Staff Directorate (J- 1, J-2,...) chairs one of the ten cross-cutting warfare areas with which JWCA deals. These directorates deliver "analytically based insights designed to stimulate and inform discussions among the four-star JROC members as they, not their

staffs, move toward specific recommendations on joint military requirements".⁴ The requirements from the CinCs are balanced against the JWCA process which oversees requirements generation and mission-needs determination.⁵ So, once JROC has linked military requirements to national military strategy, JWCA validates those requirements prior to commencement of an acquisition process. The resulting recommendations go out as Chairman's Program Recommendations, into the PPBS process, which is the central process setting the size and structure of the U.S. military.

The CMC and other service chiefs give advice and recommendations throughout each process. The service chiefs learn to understand the requirements from a joint perspective, then assist in allocating resources accordingly, through their headquarters' input into JROC/JWCA/PPBS. The new (post-GNA) PPBS is no longer a process which delivers budgetary and program recommendations to the SecDef who merely rubber-stamp the requests submitted by each of the military departments. In fact, the Chairman's recommendations challenge the program submissions of the services if he thinks, as a result of the JROC/JWCA process, that these particular service program recommendations fail to meet the needs test.⁶ The service chiefs must learn to function as a corporate entity which finds and uses cross-service solutions to U.S. security requirements, while still maintaining their roles as advocates of each respective service. The Commandant still has an influential voice in shaping the capabilities and requirements of the Marine Corps. In reality, the advice he can give is improved because he has a much broader perspective on the issues than pre-GNA Commandants were likely to develop. Because he is a full partner in the JCS and its processes, CMC shares a joint

perspective from which he can better determine when service parochialism is counter-productive to overall military requirements. This has enabled the CMC to do a better job in fulfilling one of his primary missions: **advising the National Command Authority.**

Another indirect effect of GNA is that strengthened roles of the SecDef, CJCS, and CinCs did, in fact, reduce the *warfighting* influence of the service secretaries and chiefs.⁷ The CinCs were given more peacetime authority over their warfighting components, leaving the service chiefs to play a supporting role. From a warfighting perspective, however, this is both desired and entirely consistent with the concept of unity of command. The CinCs, after all, are fully responsible for planning and accomplishing missions assigned by the SecDef. The service chiefs remain key players in delivering the forces and capabilities which the CinCs require. In delivering those forces and capabilities, the CMC fulfills another of his primary missions: **delivering capable forces to the CinCs.**

As stated earlier in this paper, the direct effects of GNA which aimed at separating civilian and military functions between service staff and secretariat have been only partially successful. Currently, many DoD reforms are being implemented to deal with the overgrown bureaucracy which harms DoD performance. Mr. William Brehm, Chairman of the Board, Systems Research and Applications Corporation stated, "The competition for resources is unrelenting; if DoD has any hope of maintaining a reasonable force structure, modernizing it, keeping it ready, and -- above all -- taking care of its people, it must become competitive. Today it is not. It's time to put a full court

press on re-engineering."⁸ Structural tensions within DoD and the services have increased along with the pressure to downsize staffs and reduce duplication. Although these efforts, if successful, will ultimately improve the performance of the Marine Corps and other services, performance improvement will not come directly from the GNA, but from some other reform initiative.

Since 1990, the Marines have reduced their endstrength by 22,000 while maintaining largely the same force structure which is mandated by law: three combat divisions, three airwings, and associated supporting establishments. Meanwhile the operational tempo of the Corps, driven by the international security environment, has climbed to its highest levels ever. During 1996 alone, Naval-Marine forces supported a record twenty-four contingency operations for the CinCs.⁹ The Marine Corps is hard pressed to meet all the needs of the CinCs, the National Command Authority, and the individual Marines and their families effectively. Improvement of service performance really addresses the Marine Corps' ability to accomplish the third primary mission of the Commandant: **meeting the requirements of the individual Marine**. By restructuring into a more responsive, more understandable organization; by reducing excess bureaucracy and waste; by clearly assigning where responsibilities lie within HQMC -- individual Marines will begin to gain the benefits of a better managed Marine Corps with greater and more relevant capabilities to fight and win, and to take care of its own. Goldwater-Nichols has made great strides in improving the structure of the DoD, and in the process employed in planning, training, and fighting jointly. The Marine Corps can move ahead on the momentum provided by GNA by focusing on how the organization

and role of the Commandant and HQMC can best serve the three prime constituencies of the CMC: The President (through the CJCS and SecDef), the CinCs, and the individual Marines.

Current Responsibilities of the Commandant and his Staff

The Commandant's current responsibilities are both specified and implied. The specified responsibilities come from the GNA as well as from Title 10, United States Code, and military directives such as DoD Directive 5100.1. These laws and directives provide the overarching framework from which the Commandant derives his responsibilities. DoD Dir 5100.1 requires the Commandant, through the Secretary of Defense, to (1) support and defend the Constitution of the United States; (2) ensure the security of the U.S. and its vital interests through timely and effective military action; and (3) to uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the U.S.. The directive goes on to state the *primary* functions of the Navy/Marine Corps Team:

"(a) To organize, train, equip and provide Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea, including operations of sea- based aircraft and land-based naval air components -- specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy, to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land, air, and space operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

(b) To maintain the Marine Corps, which shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct. However, these additional duties must not detract from, or interfere with, the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. These functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army."

These paragraphs serve to delineate the broad guidance for the Marine Corps mission.

That mission is the foundation of the Commandant's responsibility. The above paragraphs also emphasize the naval character of the Marine Corps and specifically address the fact that the Marine Corps is not to be built as "a second land army". The Commandant is responsible for following that guidance as well.

Within this general framework, then, Title 10 and DoD Direc 5100.1 spell out more specific guidelines for responsibility and organization. Table A lists the common service responsibilities for which the Commandant is accountable. The Commandant is ultimately responsible for all of them, although he is free to delegate authority to meet responsibilities to other headquarters and organizations within the Marine Corps.

Table A also presents the directed limitations on Marine Corps Headquarters organizational structure. CMC is to carry out his assigned responsibilities with the aide of the Director, Marine Corps Staff, five or less Deputy Chiefs of Staff, and three or less Assistant Chiefs of Staff. Obviously this provides only a rudimentary staff structure. The entire HQMC organization is represented in Table B. These other staff organizations have been designated in order to carry out further specified functions delineated in DoD Dir 5100.1. These are stated in Table C along with the current USMC organization which primarily carries out those functions. Additionally, Table D shows the number of officers, enlisted, and civilians assigned to HQMC and other, non-HQMC management headquarters within the Marine Corps "business enterprise". The overhead for those management functions is approximately 10% of the officers in the Marine Corps, and 1% of enlisted, dedicated to a management headquarters. The other services run between 10

and 12%.¹⁰ This relationship has not changed significantly throughout the 1980's and '90's, and although HQMC numbers have declined, a proportional increase has gone to non-HQMC management headquarters like MarCorSysCom and MCCDC. Ten percent seems to be a reasonable investment provided that there is a continuous assessment which reconciles the needs with the numbers. In the past, the Marine Corps has not had such a continuous assessment. One has now been implemented and will be discussed later in this paper.

A closer study of Table C reveals that not all the functions listed are carried out by the CMC or his primary staff at HQMC (though all Marine Corps responsibilities ultimately belong to the Commandant). Neither MCCDC, MCOTEA, nor any FMF units are part of HQMC, so the Commandant clearly has the authority to organize as he sees fit to accomplish his mission.

Up to this point, a fairly comprehensive list of *specified* functions and responsibilities of the Commandant has been brought to light. There are several important *implied* responsibilities as well. On one hand the CMC, in his role as service chief and JCS member, must serve as an "integrator" for Marine Corps capabilities within the joint framework. In other words, he must ensure that the other service chiefs know the capabilities/limitations of the Marine Corps and must be a proponent for USMC capabilities when they complement other forces/services in supporting joint requirements. The Commandant ultimately makes the decisions regarding how the Marine Corps remains unique from the other services; which tradeoffs are made in order to gain complementary capabilities at the joint level; and how best to integrate combat and

support capabilities to balance effectiveness and efficiency by using the capabilities of the other services.

On the other hand, the Commandant must hold on to some degree of "narrow service perspective". He is, after all, the one who can effectively counterbalance the trends which sometimes push the services towards being one "purple" force. It is important for Marines to stay Marines. The Commandant must fulfill the CinC's requirements while keeping the Marine Corps' employment and training aligned with its core competencies. The independent services "remain the bedrock of military capabilities. Their unique competencies enable joint warfighting".¹⁰ The Commandant is the keeper of the Marine ethos, esprit, and core competencies. He provides the balance which keeps the Marines as an elite force for the nation, naval in character, with fighting capabilities brought to shore from the sea. Past Commandant, General Carl E. Mundy remarked,

"Remember that effective jointness means blending the distinct colors of the services into a rainbow of synergistic military effectiveness. It does not suggest pouring them into a single jar and mixing them until they lose their individual properties and come out as a colorless paste. No army that has worn purple uniforms ever won a battle. Balanced military judgment and combat effectiveness depend upon service individuality, culture, training, and interpretation of the battlefield. The essence of jointness is the flexible blending of service individualities." ¹²

The Commandant is tasked with the "flexible blending", as well as with keeping the "service individuality" of the Marine Corps.

So, the specified functions and responsibilities of the Commandant, spelled out in Title 10 and DoD directives, are placed within the joint framework outlined by Goldwater-Nichols. The Commandant must balance his responsibilities to three different

constituencies which sometimes have competing interests: (1) The President (through the CJCS and SecDef); (2) the Combatant Commanders; and (3) individual Marines. The Commandant maintains this balance and carries out his responsibilities by organizing the Marine Corps as he sees fit within the guidelines set down by law. The HQMC staff exists to assist the Commandant in responding to the needs of his three constituencies. Therefore, this study will turn to a closer examination of how the headquarters and staff are organized to assist the Commandant in fulfilling his responsibilities.

HQMC Organization Initiatives

"Key to unity of effort is assignment of responsibility." -- FMFM 1-2, Ch.3, 3-1

Former USAF chief of staff and JCS Chairman, General David C. Jones, in an article for the *Joint Forces Quarterly*, highlighted some of the past organizational problems which all of the armed services shared. In his assessment, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has done little to address the following deficiencies within the defense establishment:

- authority and responsibility are badly diffused
- tough decisions are avoided
- accountability for decisions or performance is woefully inadequate
- the combat effectiveness of the fighting force --the end product-- does not receive enough attention.¹³

The general is quick to point out that these problems have been around for decades and that there are certainly no easy solutions.

It is safe to say that at least some of these problems still exist within the Marine Corps, but it should be noted that they are getting an increasing amount of attention from the top down. Just as the Department of Defense is undergoing a process called Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), the Commandant is leading the Marine Corps through the Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Program (MCCPIP). This sweeping effort "covers planning-programming- and-budgeting, force-structure process management, manpower reserve affairs, Marine base information technology process, equipment assessment process, and process-data-interface modeling" ¹⁴ within the Corps. The MCCPIP process involves building a current operating model of the Marine Corps

with certain performance benchmarks, assessing that model, and recommending changes for implementation that will substantially improve the way the Marine Corps functions in a business sense. This last statement deserves further explanation.

DoD separates military functions and headquarters elements into different categories. MCCPIP specifically deals with the "management headquarters" which is defined in DoD Instruction 5100.73 as those headquarters "exercising oversight, direction, and control of subordinate organizations or units through:

- (1) developing and issuing policies and providing policy guidelines;
- (2) reviewing and evaluating program performance;
- (3) allocating and distributing resources; or
- (4) conducting mid- and long-range planning, programming and budgeting."

This definition, then, defines the "business enterprise" of the Marine Corps, and the MCCPIP framework is being applied to that business enterprise. The actual enterprise model breaks out the four planning and control measures listed above into the more specific processes which actually deliver Marine Corps capabilities to it's customers. These processes, ideally, lead to the setting of measurable performance benchmarks (how long does a process take to deliver it's product; what level of combat readiness is produced; what customer satisfaction levels are perceived; etc). A closer look at the definition leads to the conclusion that the USMC business enterprise exceeds the bounds of HQMC, and extends to include MCCDC and MARCORSYSCOM as well.

Examining the "business enterprise" of the Marine Corps is a very useful process but it is not without some visceral difficulties which must be addressed at the outset. It is anathema for Marines raised on leadership principles and warfighting to equate their

Corps to a "business enterprise". It is difficult for many Marines to speak in terms of "management" instead of leadership; "customers" instead of friendly and enemy forces; and "quantitative measures of performance" instead of intangible forces such as ethos, esprit de corps, and cohesion which lead to victory on the battlefield. Yet from the perspective of HQMC which must deal with diminished resources, competing services, Congressional accountability, and programming and budgeting; a business enterprise model is quite useful and, in fact, quite essential. The word "customer" is not used to define a change in Marine mindset, but to describe a relationship between HQMC and both internal and external organizations which can best be described by using that term.

The business enterprise of the Marine Corps, then, consists of HQMC, MCCDC , and MARCORSYSCOM. The Commandant directs this enterprise to produce and deliver a Fleet Marine Force (FMF--the "product") which serves the requirements of the CinCs and individual Marines (his "customers"). The Commandant himself, with support from those within his business enterprise, provides advice and opinions to his third "customer", the President, through the Chairman of the JCS, and the Secretary of Defense.

The Commandant has introduced the MCCPIP initiative in order to address several problems which plague the Marine Corps. Among these are: convoluted line diagrams which mask real responsibility for Marine Corps business enterprise processes; a business process which must be radically streamlined in order to provide the Commandant better response time to his customers' needs; too much administrative overhead which diverts limited end-strength from being applied to warfighting; lack of a

means to institutionalize the "Total Quality" mindset within the Marine Corps; and the need to ensure increases in quality of life to keep and motivate high caliber Marines needed for the future.

The stated program objectives of MCCPIP are:

1. To define the Marine Corps Enterprise *in process terms* from the perspective of CMC.
2. To help prepare the Marine Corps for the 21st Century by streamlining selected business processes.
3. To conduct and integrate process improvement projects, as needed throughout the Marine Corps, including results from previous relevant studies.
4. To earn the support of Marine Corps senior leaders at all levels, while incorporating their guidance and recommendations for process improvement.
5. To develop, obtain approval for, and implement the approved changes.
6. To establish Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) for long-term implementation and management within the Marine Corps." ¹⁵

The process works by building a model of Marine Corps activity through observation, evaluation, and validation. The resulting model (called the AS-IS model) is a fair representation of how the Marine Corps business enterprise operates based on a broad consensus of those directly involved in the processes of that enterprise. The thinking involved in developing the current model leads to much higher levels of understanding about the ways in which the Corps accomplishes its tasks -- often highlighting self-induced barriers which prevent it from accomplishing tasks more effectively. The AS-IS model is then examined with the intent of streamlining and improving the process in an effort to attain a new (TO-BE) model. From this examination, recommendations are made, and resulting decisions are implemented.

One of the first items which surfaces when examining the Marine Corps model is the relationship between functions and processes. The *processes* which the business enterprise of the Marine Corps manages are: Resource Allocation; Information Management; Force Structure Management; Human Resource Development; Infrastructure Management; Materiel Life-Cycle Management; Combat Development; and Operational Planning & Execution. The last process --Operational Planning and Execution-- does not imply that the management headquarters have operational warfighting responsibilities: they do not, as GNA forbids it. However, since the Commandant must provide, train, and maintain Fleet Marine Forces for the Combatant Commanders, those functions call for many of the same processes as warfighting commanders must provide. Furthermore, it is through this process of Operational Planning and Execution that the Commandant performs his specified task of organizing, mobilizing, and demobilizing his forces. Perhaps it would be better to call this process "Operational Training Oversight", or some other name that does not suggest a process which is left over from the pre-GNA period.

To manage the processes stated above, the Commandant has a headquarters structure based on *functional organizations*. These organizations include: Plans, Policies & Operations (PP&O); Manpower & Reserve Affairs (M&RA); Aviation; Installations & Logistics (I&L); Programs & Resources (P&R); Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence (C4I); Marine Corps Combat Development Center (MCCDC); and Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM). It becomes apparent that the Marine Corps has evolved into a system which organizes its functions loosely around

the processes which it manages. This organizational structure seems more the result of historical bequest than of any rigorous analytical design which tries to address the challenges of the future. That rigorous analysis, however, is currently underway. Some of the departments, such as M&RA and I&L, have directly evolved from HQMC organizations which have existed from the Marine Corps' inception. For the first 100 years of the Corps, the CMC's principal staff was comprised of the Adjutant Inspector, the Quartermaster, and the Paymaster. Evolution of the staff has been gradually adapted to the increasing complexity of the Marine Corps -but it has always been organized along functional lines. Goldwater-Nichols shifted operational responsibilities from HQMC to the CinCs, thus leaving headquarters to focus on Service and JCS responsibilities -- still functionally organized.¹⁶

When the functions and processes are brought together in a responsibility matrix (Table E), this organizational principal, along with some glaring pitfalls of it, can easily be seen. There is a clear correlation between the functional headquarters organizations and the processes which that headquarters manages. But the AS-IS model reveals that most of the processes within the business enterprise of the Marine Corps have more than one agent (functional organization) responsible for it. This makes coordination of that process very difficult indeed, which the MCCPIP model has, in fact, verified.

One of the first steps the Commandant took to improving the Marine Corps business enterprise was to assign each process only one functional "boss", who is ultimately responsible for the process. The resultant matrix (Table F) shows an improved organization which assigns clear responsibility to one functional organization, who is

then required to *integrate* the capabilities of all the organizations in order to deliver required capabilities. Although the head of each functional area (PP&O, M&RA, etc.) controls the function of his/her own organization, he/she does not exert direct authority over all the resources required to achieve all parts of the *process*. Additionally it was found that, "if these key processes are not consciously managed, they will happen anyway, making their way through the functions at varying levels of efficiency and effectiveness. The shifting paradigm for the Marine Corps is that the leadership [now] clearly recognizes that processes can and should be managed aggressively, and in such a way that they are not disrupted regardless of organizational change or shifting internal priorities."¹⁷ This highlights the need for the process "owner" to establish special staff teams made up of members from other functional organizations which can coordinate the process and properly allocate resources across functional lines. "By managing processes in addition to functions, the organization moves away from the more traditional one-dimensional management of functions to a three-dimensional management of functions, processes, and the relationship between them."¹⁸

Should HQMC, then, be organized according to *process* rather than *function*?

The problem is that the processes which HQMC manages are so interdependent. For that matter, so are the functional organizations. The Force Structure Management process, for instance, is "owned" by MCCDC, but relies heavily upon input from the Human Development Resource process ("owned" by M&RA). Infrastructure Management and Material Lifecycle Management are also closely intertwined, yet distinct. *All* the processes rely heavily upon Resource Allocation and Information Management processes.

Likewise, the Research, Development, and Acquisition *functions*, run by MarCorSysCom, are heavily influenced by other functional organizations like Aviation and MCCDC (the Concept-Based Requirements function). Since Aviation deals with separate budget and procurement channels ("blue dollars"), its organization as a separate functional organization is justified. So, organizing along purely functional *OR* process lines does not seem practical in light of the interdependence of the functions and processes which the business enterprise manages. Additionally, some pressure to keep functional organizations exists to facilitate functional interface with JCS and other service functional organizations.

Thus far the Marine Corps has favored Headquarters organization along functional lines, but has not paid a lot of conscious attention as to how to organize effectively to meet its *process* requirements. The MCCPIP initiative is proving to be an excellent tool for coming to terms with how the Corps should organize its business enterprise with process management chiefly in mind. A case study of one process of the Marine Corps business enterprise will illustrate.

The Human Resource Development Process (HRDP) within the Marine Corps is a complex process which is nominally "owned" by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S M&RA). This individual process --developing human resources-- was modeled and benchmarked using the MCCPIP. The HRDP was broken down into six subprocesses: Develop Plans; Access/Classify; Train & Educate; Assign; Promote; and Attrite. (See Table G) Ideally the subprocesses work in an integrated fashion to deliver the "product" of the process: organizations staffed with the right

Marines, in the right place, at the right time, with the right skills and the right quality of life.¹⁹

Closer examination reveals that, although DC/S M&RA "owns" the HRDP, she does not directly control all of the subprocesses that allow her to accomplish the mission. The head of the Marine Corps Recruit Command does not work for DC/S M&RA, yet Recruit Command "owns" the Access/Classify subprocess of the HRDP and is responsible for recruiting and recruit training. Since DC/S M&RA does not control the resources for that subprocess, she must depend on close coordination with Recruit Command in order to get the desired input for her process. The modeling and benchmarking bring into question whether or not a separate Recruit Command, for example, is an efficient application of resources within the HRDP. Once M&RA has addressed some of its other organizational problems, it makes the most sense to place the recruiting subprocess back under the control of the HRDP.

Another subprocess of HRDP is Training and Education. In the AS-IS model of the Marine Corps, MCCDC is responsible for Force Structure issues which include buying the seats at the various schools which train the Marine Corps "human resources". There is a strong case for MCCDC to make decisions regarding *what* training should consist of: i.e., the curriculum and actual training objectives of each of the schools. But it would make more sense for M&RA to "buy the seats"-- allowing it to set the size and timing of the classes in order to facilitate accomplishing its goal of "the right Marine, at the right place, at the right time...".

These are just two of the issues which surface as a result of MCCPIP modeling. For the Human Resource Development Process, the modeling discovered six "management issues", each of which contained a series of noted deficiencies, corrections and recommendations. As each major process in the Marine Corps business enterprise goes through the MCCPIP analysis, some trends are beginning to emerge, among them the following:

- The Marine Corps, as an institution, does not recognize the existence of its own processes
- Integration/Coordination of planning is deficient
- Information systems are designed and managed to support organizational (functional) stovepipes
- Frequent leadership changes are disruptive
- Focus in many organizations is only on current operations
- Effective, customer-based performance measures are difficult to identify and institute²⁰

The MCCPIP process leads the Marine Corps towards a "matrix" form of organization, keeping both its functional organizations and its new orientation to process management. This makes the most sense. Table E graphically depicts the matrix and delineates which functional leaders have primary responsibility for each process. This "process owner" will be accountable for the achievement of the performance goals of that process over time. Although the process owner does not control all the resources and personnel the process requires within his/her functional organization, that owner does control enough resources to effectively manage the process (several organizations right now are close to 80% capable of fulfilling all process requirements within their functional organization).²¹

The challenge of the matrix organization is to coordinate effectively *between* functions and processes. Special staff organizations which perform such coordination will be key to achieving desired process performance. These staffs, dedicated to the coordination effort, identify and remove organizational roadblocks. While serving on these special staffs, they will answer directly to the process owner for their performance, no matter which organizational department they were assigned from. In many ways, this approach resembles the Marine Corps Planning Process for warfighting. The special staff works like the Operational Planning Team, bringing the different areas of expertise together for concurrent and integrated planning. Functional organizations which do not "own" a process, such as the Judge Advocate Division, Public Affairs, Administration & Resource Management, and History & Museums; should be held accountable for service they provide to both internal and external customers, rather than to any particular process performance.

As the MCCPIP analysis is continuous for the Marine Corps; individual corrections for each deficiency will be identified and overall recommendations will surface, which then become implementation decisions for the Commandant and his staff on an on-going basis. This process is extremely comprehensive and expectations for noticeable improvements are justifiably high. Clearly, business process re-engineering will change the way Marine Corps management headquarters are run and organized. Although it is too early to appreciate the full implications of recommended changes, the Commandant is counting on the fact that MCCPIP will render an organization which is more responsive to his customers' needs, and much clearer in its assignment of

responsibility. But Marines must think beyond improving the current processes and ask whether those current processes are adequate for the Marine Corps of 2010 and beyond.

Into the Next Millennium

We will be a learning organization that creates individuals who not only can adapt to changing situations, but who can anticipate and even activate them. We will be self critical, quick to identify shortcomings, and relentless in our efforts to improve.

--General C. C. Krulak, CMC, USMC

The MCCPIP initiative is addressing many organizational challenges and will very likely deliver the desired results. Much of the ground covered during the initiative's first phases focused on defining processes and their relationship to Marine Corps organizations. That focus is leading to more sound decisions regarding the restructuring of HQMC and other management headquarters. A lot of time and energy have been invested in the process already. Both DoD and the Commandant are committed to seeing the process through. For the most part, then, the structural changes for the Marine Corps business enterprise will grow out of the MCCPIP reforms. Provided that the new matrix-type organization which is evolving is backed by the staffing which coordinates the processes, these reforms will be effective in beginning the organizational changes which meet 21st century challenges.

Institutionalizing those changes, however, is the greater challenge which looms in the future for the Commandant and his headquarters. This paper proposes four areas which are not adequately addressed as a result of MCCPIP and need to be further examined as the Marine Corps steps into the 21st century. These are areas which will require increased attention. Two of these areas deal directly with institutionalizing change within Marine Corps culture. Two other areas deal with shortfalls in providing Marines with the requisite information and quality of life which will attract, serve, and motivate

the highest quality Marines the Corps will require. These shortfalls must be addressed to facilitate the cultural changes required for business process reengineering to succeed.

1. Monitor the difficulty of identifying and quantifying tangible results.

Publicize headquarters reengineering objectives Marine Corps-wide, to enlist the help and understanding of all Marines in achieving the desired results.

Though the process of changing has begun, the key for the Marine Corps will be in institutionalizing this change to a more efficient, more creative, and more process-oriented mindset or culture. An early boost to this institutionalization will come when the initial tangible improvements in the business enterprise processes become noticeable outside "the beltway". But right now, the vast majority of the Corps does not know that it's headquarters organizations are reengineering; it doesn't know what MCCPIP *is*. This must change soon: the Marines must be told what such a comprehensive re-evaluation and re-organization is doing for them, as well as the expected results of the process changes. These changes become more apparent when coupled to quantifiable measures which show change readily. According to Major General Michael J. Williams, "quantifiable measures of process improvement encourage the process owners, workers, and customers because the results are tangible and concrete. The improvements can be seen by the people on the shop floor and they get excited and want to make further improvements. I became convinced by this experience that, when junior officers and senior SNCO's buy into that process, things begin to change." ²² In the complex processes with which the Marine Corps business enterprise is involved, quantifiable measures are often difficult to identify. It is extremely important to identify

them, however. *If performance* of a process is difficult to quantify, then the *outcomes* of the process may be identified -even if through subjective measurements like customer surveys. Whether or not reform is successfully implemented will depend on the ability of the MCCPIP to identify and quantify tangible results. That ability must be closely monitored. If the business reengineering process fails to deliver measurable benchmarks -- and if it fails to identify "process owner accountability for the results -- it will be very difficult for the Marine Corps as a whole to "buy in" to the process.

2. Monitor the vital signs to "change the way we change".²³

In addition to the Continuous Process Improvement Program and the Total Quality initiatives currently working for change within the Marine Corps, the Commandant and his successors in the 21st century will need a way to monitor the health, vigor, and adaptability of the Marine Corps' functional organizations. In an organization the size of the U.S. Marine Corps, it is often difficult to tell when a process or function breaks down until the problem is fairly serious and widespread. Indicators of a "broken system" with the sensitivity and reliability to be useful have, until now, been difficult to identify.

A study recently published in *The Harvard Business Review* by Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga answers this challenge. Their study, entitled "Changing the Way We Change",²⁴ examines three large organizations who have confronted the problem of implementing change throughout their organization. The organizations studied are Sears, Roebuck & Company; Royal Dutch Shell; and the U.S. Army. The authors point out that the problem is not so much *initiating* change, but rather that "the whole burden of change typically rests on so few people. ...

In other words, the number of people *at every level* who make committed, imaginative contributions to organizational success is simply too small. More employees need to take a greater interest and a more active role in the business. More of them need to care deeply about success. Companies achieve real agility only when every function, office, strategy, goal, and process - when every person - is able and eager to rise to every challenge. This type of fundamental change, commonly called *revitalization* or *transformation*, is what more and more companies seek but all too rarely achieve." ²⁵

Once the business reengineering process is implemented in the Marine Corps, the leadership must focus on this transformation. One major challenge is in knowing how (and whether) transformation is working.

The *HBR* study suggests monitoring four "vital signs of organizational vigor". These vital signs deal directly with the concept of an organization's culture. In fact, the vital signs virtually define culture. In the three organizations examined by the study, transformation efforts looked quite different. "In all three organizations, however, the 800-pound gorilla that impaired performance and stifled change was culture." ²⁶ Four vital signs which the study's authors define as "four distinct indicators that are highly predictive of performance in good times and in bad" are:

Power: Do employees believe they can effect organizational performance? Do they believe they have the power to make things happen? [How closely do senior officers listen to junior officers and NCOs?]

Identity: Do individuals identify rather narrowly with their professions [infantry, armor, aviation, logistics], working teams, or functional units; or do they identify with the organization as a whole?

Conflict: How do members of the organization handle conflict? Do they smooth problems over, or do they confront and resolve them? [How receptive are leaders to question and alternative?]

Learning: How does the organization learn? How does it deal with new ideas? [Is the Battle Lab, for example, going to be truly experimental, or will it become a validator for someone's preconceived notions of how things are to be?]²³

Currently, with the Marine Corps proceeding through an in-depth process of re-inventing itself, many of these vital signs are consistent with the overall direction of change in the Corps --at least at the higher levels. Quite possibly the lower levels are transforming as well with the introduction of the "Crucible" and cohesion initiatives in the training and assignment of new Marines. The largest segment of the Marine Corps, the middle ranks for both officers and enlisted, must become the *focus of effort* as it will present the largest challenge, both culturally and numerically. The Marine Corps leadership must directly monitor these vital signs and intervene when any of them show a need for improvement. The vital signs lend themselves to monitoring by commanders down to squadron/battalion level, and possibly below. For the Commandant, the extent to which the Marine Corps (as a unit) measures up, is a primary concern when gauging whether or not the cultural transformation is taking place. Once the MCCPIP initiatives are implemented, the Commandant, as the Corps' primary change agent, will need to focus on the institutionalization of those initiatives. Holding his subordinate headquarters commanders accountable for the transformation will be made easier by monitoring the vital signs of power, identity, conflict, and learning. Subordinate units should also be able to hold HQMC accountable for the support/customer service they receive. Too often, the perspective seems to be from the opposite view: how can the fleet units serve the convenience of the headquarters.

To review the argument thus far, the direction for change in the DoD was set by the Goldwater-Nichols act, and refined by the QDR process. The vision for the Marine

Corps was provided by the Commandant in the form of *Forward...From the Sea* and the *Commandant's Planning Guidance*. DoD and Marine Corps initiatives to re-engineer the business process of the Marine Corps reside in the MCCPIP reform process, results of which should become implemented in the near term. *If* MCCPIP succeeds in delivering measurable performance criteria for the very complex processes of the Marine Corps business enterprise -- and *if* the implemented changes can be successfully institutionalized; then the Marine Corps will be better positioned to take on the challenges of the 21st century.

The future is full of uncertainty. But if the *processes* which deliver the required results to the Commandant's primary customers -- the President, the CinCs, and the Marines -- are fine tuned, and if the strategic guidance is sound; then the Marine Corps can quickly respond to future challenges with success -- whatever they may be. The desired result of reform was the quick and accurate response to the customers of the Marine Corps business enterprise. The MCCPIP should deliver those fine-tuned processes, but the Commandant must ensure that it does; and institutionalization of the processes must be closely monitored.

Two more issues must receive the attention of the Commandant in order to mitigate two risks brought on by future uncertainty. One risk is that Marines will respond to a crisis on very short order without the informational tools they need to meet the challenges ahead. The other risk is that the Marine Corps will not deliver on promises to improve the quality of life of its Marines and their families, thereby preventing Marines from "buying into" the change process, and endangering the ability of the Corps to keep

it's most significant assets -- the highest trained and motivated Marines and civilians possible.

3. When implementing Information Systems to support the MCCPIP changes, do not focus merely on serving the IM needs of HQMC at the expense of information needs of the wider Marine Corps. Provide the conduit through which Marines can connect to the vast amount of focused information they will require to meet tomorrow's challenges. In a Marine Corps study entitled, *Beyond 2010: A Marine Perspective*, the future of the Marine Corps centers on crisis response capabilities which require forcible entry across the entire spectrum of military operations.²⁸ Furthermore, the national security strategy and military strategy will demand more of a system which will require complementary, mobile, lethal, and agile forces. The nation will demand more of its warriors in terms of skill and intellect than it has ever done in the past. The services will increasingly compete for a higher standard of recruit. These recruits will be made into highly trained, thinking warriors with more skill and responsibility than we now enjoy. Will the Marine Corps be ready to support them? If design and implementation of information management infrastructure is focused solely on the relatively narrow needs of HQMC from the "business enterprise" perspective, it will not be structured to meet the wider needs of its Marine customers as well.

Multi-dimensional forces such as the Marine Corps will absolutely depend upon highly trained and educated people. They are the cornerstone of the operational concepts which the Marines are experimenting with and implementing right now. These Marines will be "capable of all source intelligence fusion, rapid pattern recognition, and on the

spot risk analysis."²⁹ In military operations other than war, Marines must decide between hostile and friendly; lethal and non-lethal; high-tech and low-tech; religious/political motives or survival motives -- all under pressures of time, stress, and eminent danger. In order to succeed in this "thrive on chaos" environment, Marines must possess utmost confidence in their own knowledge, abilities, and intuition. This confidence must grow not only out of sound training and education, but by a constantly updated pool of knowledge which lets Marines find out the whole situation, in real time, as they are deploying to a hot spot.

With the constant barrage of information available to Marines, they need a conduit which can focus their search for relevant professional information in order to save time, as well as focus on the truly important bits of data that affect their lives, families, and jobs. Headquarters Marine Corps should provide this conduit. When a Marine is up for orders, he or she should be able to log onto a network, get the orders, set up a move, look at the "Welcome aboard" package for the next duty station, get added to the housing list, and view the job bank prospects for a spouse -- all at one sitting. When a Marine is getting ready to deploy, a complete interactive brief should be available on a network which provides the Marine with climatological data, cultural and political information, news and analysis of current events, and any other information which will make that Marine's approach to the deployment more informed and professional. HQMC, through the DC/S for C4I, should provide this and a host of other interactive networking functions which support Marines through the latest information technology. But it must be built from the ground up -- beginning now.

Goal "G" of the *United States Marine Corps Master Plan for the 21st Century* states several objectives which need to be achieved. The focused information conduit which HQMC should provide, addresses five of the eight objectives listed under the goal of "Prepare Marines for the challenges of the 21st Century". The five objectives which are addressed are:

- ▶ Train, equip, and *educate* Marines as the cornerstone of our warfighting capability.
- ▶ Create opportunities for Marines to learn from shared experiences.
- ▶ Modernize training and education through advanced technologies.
- ▶ Foster military thinking and decision making.
- ▶ Improve awareness of regional political, economic, cultural, and social issues and their impact on security and military operations.

Marines need access to focused information whether they are at home, in garrison, deployed, or on independent duty. Because of this, HQMC should be the fulcrum upon which this effort bends. Centrally accessible, plugged into "everything", and in the best position to decide which data to provide for the focused information required, DC/S for C4I could move the Marines into the 21st century equipped and ready for the challenges ahead.

4. Deliver on the promises of quality-of-life improvements so Marines can "buy in" to the cultural changes which the next millennium requires.

If the challenges of the future are to be met, the Marine Corps must move away from the static frameworks of past days.³⁰ For many years the Marine Corps culture has held fast

to the ideal of doing the most with the least. In warfighting this has helped the Marines, but in recent years, the same mentality has taken its toll on Marines and their families because the Marine Corps has not addressed the requirement to "take care of its own" very well at all.

According to a MCCPIP HRDP Working Group briefing: 43% of junior Marines are dissatisfied with their quality of life; the Marine Corps consistently falls short of DoD funding levels for QOL issues; centrally defined USMC quality of life baseline requirements and standards do not exist; Commanders obligate QOL funds to satisfy other priorities; and MILCON requirements still have a low priority.³¹ Perhaps it is a cultural mindset that Marines must always provide the largest "bang" for the defense dollar, or that asking for too many amenities in the budget will make Marines "soft". The Marine Corps can no longer endure the costs of these illusions. Reengineering of the management headquarters provides the Marine Corps with an excellent opportunity to change this mindset as well.

If Marines "must be prepared to fight on the shortest of notice, under any circumstances, in conflicts large or small ...our strategy, and the means employed to achieve its ends, will have to be far more agile than in the past." ³² Referring back to the Harvard study, "organizational agility and the disciplines that sustain it make enormous demands on people. Organizations must make sure that members receive commensurate returns."³³ So in the coming "age of agility", taking care of Marines will be an absolute requirement. Paying military members (monetarily and otherwise) at or near the poverty rate will not yield the caliber of intellectual warrior that future plans are counting on. Not

only must these quality of life elements be provided, but they must be first rate, if Marines are to be retained and motivated in an atmosphere of turmoil and chaos. This element becomes more important as Marines deploy jointly alongside other U.S. services. The perception of a significant gap between the services' QOL standards will run counter to good order and discipline in the joint arena.

Much has been promised in providing quality of life enhancement; but if these promises do not deliver first rate programs and facilities, the Marines will not compete successfully in the long run with the other services for the highest caliber professional warriors. Structural streamlining of the process will not deliver changes in QOL by itself. Those changes will only stem from a shift in culture which allows Marines to invest in the programs which really do "take care of their own". This, in turn, will facilitate junior Marines in buying into whatever changes are required to meet the challenges ahead.

The Marine Corps is presented with a golden opportunity. In the wake of defense reforms initiated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and using the momentum provided by business process re-engineering; the Corps is well positioned to move ahead into the next millennium and succeed. The Commandant has only to follow through on the reforms. Ahead lies the difficult work of institutionalizing the changes. The Marine Corps leadership must first publicize the changes and the goals of its reengineering process. Then, if measurable results can be identified and monitored; if the Marine Corps pays attention to the vital signs that measure changing institutional culture -- the structure of the Marine Corps business enterprise will provide agile and responsive processes which

deliver required warfighting capabilities. If the Marine Corps can focus the information requirements of Marines, and offer them tangible gains in their quality of life -- then the Marines will buy into the changes and move into the 21st Century with the strongest of human resources available to them. These human resources -- the Marines -- are the foundation of the future Corps. The coming structural changes are sound. If Marines can infuse the culture of change into the entire Corps, the future of this golden opportunity will be bright, indeed.

Endnotes

¹ James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 11.

² James R. Locher III, "Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 16.

³ William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, "Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 38.

⁴ William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, "Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 38.

⁵ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01: A-3.

⁶ William A. Owens and James R. Blaker, "Overseeing Cross-Service Trade Offs", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 39.

⁷ Michael R. Donley, "Prospects for the Military Departments", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 59.

⁸ William Brehm, "On Revolution, Barriers, and Common Sense", lecture presented at National Defense University, Washington, DC, 3 December 1996.

⁹ William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and Congress*, Pentagon, Washington, DC (April 1997): 256.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, "DoD Active Duty Military Personnel Assigned to Military Management Headquarters", downloaded from <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmids/military> on 28 November 1997.

¹¹ John P. White, "Defense Organization Today", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 19.

¹² John P. White, "Defense Organization Today", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 21.

¹³ David C. Jones, "Past Organizational Problems", *Joint Forces Quarterly*, (Autumn 1996): 27.

¹⁴ "Human Resources Development Process (HRDP) Working Group", a presentation given to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower & Reserve Affairs, USMC, Washington, DC, 27 March 1996.

¹⁵ Michael S. Yoemans, "Business Process Reengineering", presentation to the Senior Command Staff, USMC, Washington, DC, 15 December 1996.

¹⁶ "Command Element/Command Headquarters Conference Read-Ahead Package, "Marine Corps Staffs", downloaded from MAGTF Staff Training Program Web site at <http://mstp.quantico.usmc.mil>, 20 October 1997.

¹⁷ "The Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Program: Program Goals and Results to Date", *TQView*, (Spring 1996): 7.

¹⁸ "The Marine Corps Continuous Process Improvement Program: Program Goals and Results to Date", *TQView*, (Spring 1996): 7.

¹⁹ "Managing the HDRP", a conference brief given to LtGen. Carol Mutter by Col. Mark Pizzo, Washington, DC, 8 October 1997.

²⁰ Michael S. Yoemans, "Business Process Reengineering", presentation to the Senior Command Staff, USMC, Washington, DC, 15 December 1996.

²¹ Working Group of the Marine Corps Process Improvement Program (MCPIP), "Discussion Paper: Understanding and Instituting Process Management", Washington, DC, draft as of 19 March 1996.

²² "An Interview with MajGen. Michael J. Williams", *TQView*, (Spring 1996): 2.

²³ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga, "Changing the Way We Change", *Harvard Business Review*, (November-December 1997): 127.

²⁴ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga, "Changing the Way We Change", *Harvard Business Review*, (November-December 1997): 127.

²⁵ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga, "Changing the Way We Change", *Harvard Business Review*, (November-December 1997): 132.

²⁶ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga, "Changing the Way We Change", *Harvard Business Review*, (November-December 1997): 132.

²⁷ Richard Pascale, Mark Milleman, and Linda Gioga, "Changing the Way We Change", *Harvard Business Review*, (November-December 1997): 136.

²⁸ Marine Corps Combat Development Center, "Beyond 2010: A Marine Perspective", unpublished concept paper funded by MCCDC, May 1996, 6.

²⁹ Marine Corps Combat Development Center, "Beyond 2010: A Marine Perspective", unpublished concept paper funded by MCCDC, May 1996, 7.

³⁰ Marine Corps Combat Development Center, "Beyond 2010: A Marine Perspective", unpublished concept paper funded by MCCDC, May 1996, 8.

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Department of Defense Instruction 5100.1_ Organization of the Service Headquarters.

Title X, United States Code.

Title 10, U.S. Code Responsibilities of the Marine Corps

Subject to authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments, including the following:

- (1) Basic Responsibilities
 - a. recruiting
 - b. organizing
 - c. supplying
 - d. equipping (includes R&D)
 - e. training
 - f. servicing
 - g. mobilizing
 - h. demobilizing
 - i. administering (including morale and welfare of personnel)
 - j. maintaining
- (2) Investigate and report efficiency and preparation to support military operations by combatant commanders
- (3) Prepare detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans and supervise such execution*
- (4) As directed by the Secretary of the Navy or Commandant of the Marine Corps, coordinate the action of organizations of the U.S. Marine Corps
- (5) Perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy

Organization:

In order to perform the above responsibilities, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is given a Chief of Staff (Director, Marine Corps Staff); Not more than five Deputy Chiefs of Staff (currently Manpower & Reserve Affairs, Installations & Logistics, Plans, Policies & Operations, Aviation, and Programs & Requirements); and not more than three Assistant Chiefs of Staff (currently only C4I).

** does not necessarily entail an operational plan (CinC responsibility); but administrative and programmatic plans which fall to the CMC to execute*

Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps Organization




Table B

Common Service Functions:*	Who primarily performs this function in USMC now:
(Specified Tasks)	
1. Determine Service force requirements and make recommendations to support national security objectives and strategy and to meet operational requirements of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders	CMC, PP&O, C4I
2. Plan for the use of intrinsic capabilities of resources of the other services that may be made available	CMC, PP&O, FMF, C4I
3. Recommend to JCS the assignment and deployment of forces to Unified and Specified Combatant Commanders established by the President through the Secretary of Defense	CMC, PP&O, FMF
4. Administer Service forces	M&RA
5. Provide logistics support for service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense	I&L, P&R MarCorSysCom, Aviation
6. Develop doctrine, procedure, tactics, and techniques employed by service forces	MCCDC
7. Conduct operational testing and evaluation	MCCDC, SysCom Aviation, MCOTEA
8. Provide for training for joint operations and joint exercises in support of Unified and Specified Combatant Command operational requirements	FMF, PP&O
9. Operate organic land vehicles, aircraft, ships, or craft	FMF
10. Consult and coordinate with other services on all matters of joint concern	CMC directed
11. Participate with the other Services in the development of the doctrines, procedures, tactics, techniques, training, publications, and equipment for such joint operations as are the primary responsibility of one of the services	MCCDC, P&R, C4I, MarCorSysCom

*Source: Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 (September 25, 1987)

Table C

USMC MANAGEMENT HEADQUARTERS

Organizations	USMC Active Duty		Total Military	Civilians	Total
	Officer	Enlisted			
HQMC-Special Offices	29	39	68	243	311
HQMC-M&RA	66	33	99	0	99
HQMC-C4I	48	27	75	0	75
HQMC-I&L	72	22	94	0	94
HQMC-P&R	72	17	89	0	89
HQMC-PP&O	75	52	127	0	127
HQMC-JA	17	13	30	0	30
HQMC-Aviation	62	32	94	0	94
HQMC-PA	11	17	28	0	28
HQMC-Admin & Resrc	13	106	119	0	119
HQMC-RA	6	3	9	0	9
HQMC-MWR	7	2	9	0	9
HQMC-Hist/Museums	4	8	12	0	12
HQMC-MH	21	38	59	0	59
HQMC-MCRC	39	46	85	0	85
HQMC-Safety	5	1	6	0	6
HQMC-IG	16	5	21	0	21
Audio/Vis Support	0	1	1	0	1
HQMC Totals	563	462	1,025	243	1,268
MarCorSysCom	308	181	489	575	1,064
MCTSSA	55	209	264	0	264
LAV	4	22	26	0	26
MCCDC	230	74	304	50	354
Doctrine	26	1	27	0	27
MCOTEA	28	2	30	13	43
MC Intel. Agency	21	32	53	0	53
Total HQ Population	1,235	983	2,218	953	3,171

From T/O 9910 (15 Jul 95) USMC: Total # Officers: 17,825 Total# Enlisted: 156,087

Table D

Responsibility Matrix
From SRA Corporation

MCCPIP "AS-IS" MODEL	Functions & Organizations							
	Policy	Personnel	Aviation	Support	Resources	Information	Concept Based Requirements	Research, Development, & Acquisition
<i>Processes</i>	PP&O	M&RA	AVN	I&L	P&R	C4I	MCCDC	SYSCOM
Resources Allocation	R		R		R		R	
Information Management		R		R		R	R	R
Force Structure	R	R	R	R			R	
Human Resources		R	R				R	
Infrastructure Management				R		R		
Material Life Cycle Management				R		R	R	R
Combat Development							R	
Operational Planning & Execution	R							

R = Responsible Agent

Table E

Responsibility Matrix

From SRA Corporation

MCCPIP "TO-BE" MODEL									Functions & Organizations			
	Policy	Personnel	Aviation	Support	Resources	Information	Concept Based Requirements	Research, Development, & Acquisition				
Processes	PP&O	M&RA	AVN	I&L	P&R	C4I	MCCDC	SYSCOM				
Resources Allocation					R							
Information Management						R						
Force Structure Management							R					
Human Resource Development		R										
Infrastructure Management								R				
Material Life Cycle Management				R								
Combat Development							R					
Operational Planning & Execution	R											

R = Responsible Agent

Table F

The Fundamental HRDP Process
("owned" by M&RA)

Sub-Processes:




Table G